In the debate over the proposed establishment of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency, much attention has been given to discussion of whether consumers are irrational or incompetent and therefore need paternalistic regulators to look after them, and whether inadequate consumer protection regulation was a contributor to the financial crisis. Arguments over these questions are misplaced. Consumer protection regulation is commonplace in financial markets, and is essential even where consumers are fully rational and financial crises are distant. The potential role for a CFPA should first be examined based on consideration of the benefits and shortcomings of current consumer protection regulation, and how a dedicated consumer protection regulator would be likely to change things. Specific details of proposed legislation that affect the structure and authority of a CFPA should be evaluated separately rather than being used to determine whether such an agency is a good idea or a bad one. Consideration of the general principles for and against establishment of an independent CFPA may help to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of specific legislative proposals.
Introduction
Recent financial reform legislation has proposed the creation of a new federal agency charged with protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive and abusive practices by bank and non-bank financial institutions. 1 The proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) would be a federal agency with a dedicated funding stream, financed at least in part by fees from regulated entities. The agency would have authority over credit, savings, and payment instruments, and other consumer financial products and services except for investment products and services regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 2 The CFPA would become the sole federal overseer of consumer protection in financial services, with broad authority to supervise and examine providers of covered financial products, enforce consumer protection regulations, write new rules and take enforcement actions for violations.
Establishment of a CFPA would represent a sharp departure from the current U.S.
practice of financial regulatory divisions along institutional boundaries. Currently separate regulatory agencies oversee different sectors of the financial services industry. Consolidating authority for consumer protection regulation within a CFPA would remove the consumer protection functions from these regulators and would also reduce the role of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in protecting consumers of financial services. 2 Insurance, which is regulated by the states, would also be exempt from the CFPA's authority. 3 The FTC, as the primary federal consumer protection agency, exercises some oversight of deceptive practices of non-bank financial institutions that do not fall under the authority of specific financial regulatory agencies; the FTC is prohibited from regulating banks, securities or insurance companies.
politically engaging, these arguments risk distracting attention from two important principles that should be at the heart of the discussion. First, consumer protection regulation is provided by all financial regulators and is warranted irrespective of the rationality of consumers or the immediacy of financial crises. Second, the need to modernize U.S. financial services regulation is clear and regulatory reorganization is an important part of that agenda.
To begin to refocus the debate it may be useful to recall that an independent consumer protection agency was part of the Blueprint for financial regulatory reform developed and proposed by the Treasury Department under the Bush Administration, and thus is not solely a response to the financial crisis or driven by ideological desires to increase the role of government. 5 The potential role for a CFPA should be examined based on consideration of the benefits and shortcomings of current consumer protection regulation, and of how a dedicated consumer protection regulator would change things. Specific details of proposed legislation that affect the structure and authority of a CFPA are clearly important.
However, these should be evaluated separately and should not be used to determine whether a separate CFPA is a good idea or a bad one. Consideration of the general principles for and against establishment of an independent CFPA may help to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of specific legislative proposals.
The Need for Consumer Protection Regulation
The primary motivation for consumer protection regulation in financial markets is the fact that consumers have less information than sellers about product attributes, prices and seller quality. Together, these factors determine product quality and so the central information problem facing consumers in financial markets is judging product quality. The costs to consumers of obtaining information on financial product quality are significant. The quality characteristics of financial products are often difficult to ascertain due to the complex set of contingencies determining the benefits and costs of the product over its lifetime; the contingent nature of services, fees and rates of returns; and the fact that these may change over time. Because product differences across sellers are often manifest as differences in these features, quality comparisons across sellers may also be difficult.
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Counterbalancing these problems are competitive market forces which should work to protect consumers. Because of the intangible nature of financial products and services, consumer confidence is central to the existence and functioning of markets for these goods.
Financial firms thus have strong incentives to maintain consumers' faith in their products and reputations, as do the financial services industries collectively. Such reputation constraints on quality will work only imperfectly, however. The difficulties that consumers face in judging quality mean that consumers' assessment of a seller's reputation will adjust only slowly to new information and will be based partly on the reputation of the industry as a whole. This slow adjustment may create situations in which some sellers have an incentive to deliberately misrepresent or provide lower quality in order to earn higher profits in the short run. The longer the length of time it takes until consumers recognize seller quality reductions or misrepresentations, the greater the risk that such actions will yield benefits to Barr, Mullainathan and Shafir (2008b) for discussion of the relationship between consumer psychology and sellers' incentives. 8 In principle, this may be accomplished either through industry self-regulatory organizations or through government regulations. Industry self-regulation is widely practiced internationally in the securities industry, for example. Government regulation is a substitute for self-regulation and provides stronger enforcement powers and less susceptibility to capture by industry interests. 9 See, for example, Camerer et. al, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Barr, Mullainathan and Shafir, 2008a. overseeing all aspects of the operations of the institutions under its purview. This includes regulation focused on safety and soundness (e.g., monitoring financial condition, risk and risk management; writing and enforcing rules to enhance financial soundness; and dealing with failing institutions) and regulation focused on market conduct (e.g., monitoring selling practices; enforcing compliance with consumer protection regulations; dealing with consumer complaints; and providing consumer education). In principle, both of these regulatory functions protect consumers, but in specific decision contexts their objectives will often conflict. For example, some seller practices that lead to higher profitability may enhance safety and soundness objectives but denigrate consumer protection objectives. Issues and Problems U.S. financial regulation has long been criticized as excessively fragmented, and is increasingly viewed as out of date and out of step with regulatory systems in other countries.
Over the past thirty years, many countries have worked to consolidate financial regulatory authority. A growing number of countries, among them the prominent financial centers of the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, consolidate regulatory authority within a single financial regulator. Many other countries have partially consolidated regulatory authority, for example by combining oversight of two or more financial sectors (e.g., banking and insurance, or banking and investments) within a single agency. Other countries organize financial regulation by functional areas rather than by institutional boundaries, through the establishment of separate safety and soundness and market conduct regulators, each with authority over all financial institutions.
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The impetus for regulatory consolidation generally has been to match the regulatory architecture more closely with financial industry structure. Financial and competitive innovations have led to the growth of financial conglomerates and the blurring of distinctions between different financial products and institutions. The desire to improve systemic risk regulation has been a primary driver of change, but regulatory efficiency and consumer protection regulation have also been at issue. Benefits sought from regulatory consolidation include reducing coordination costs, reducing duplicative regulations, reducing regulatory gaps and avoiding negative effects of regulatory competition.
The fragmented bank regulatory system in the U.S. has proven to be particularly susceptible to regulatory gaps and to harmful regulatory competition. These shortcomings have negative consequences for consumer protection regulation.
Gaps occur when regulatory authority over an institution or a problem is unclear, or when regulatory accountability is shared. When all financial institutions operate within a single industry sector, institutional regulation can minimize gaps. However, institutional regulation of conglomerate firms, or of products that cross institutional boundaries, greatly increases the risk of gaps. In U.S. bank regulation, this problem is exacerbated by the separation of rule-making authority from enforcement authority for the major consumer Regulatory competition in the U.S. bank regulation system has not eliminated consumer protection regulation: federal laws contain a number of significant consumer protections (Bair, 2003) and U.S. regulation is more stringent than in many other countries (Jackson, 2007) . However, lax enforcement of consumer protections has been a problem. Similarly, FDIC data indicate that nearly one-third of the complaints it received in 2006 were not within its jurisdiction (Tennyson, 2008) . After Congressional interest in the problem, federal and state bank regulators began a formal process of complaint sharing in 2007.
All of this adds up to suggest that consumer protection does not receive the same priority as safety, soundness and industry promotion among bank regulators. It is interesting that this does not appear to be the case in insurance regulation, even though insurance companies may choose the state in which they are chartered. On the contrary, many observers argue that state insurance regulation is overly focused on consumer protection, creating market inefficiencies as a result. 15 An important distinction between insurance and bank regulation which may explain this difference is the fact that insurance companies are subject to the laws and regulations of every state in which they operate. That is, the chartering state's laws do not preempt other states' laws. In contrast, beginning in the mid1990s, federally regulated banks asserted and won the right to ignore state regulations under the argument that federal law may preempt state law.
Interstate banking was first allowed in 1994 by the Riegle-Neal Act. Concerns about interstate banks being subject to multiple state regulations led to amendments in 1997 that directed the OCC to examine the applicability of state laws to national banks. The extent to which federal regulation may preempt state regulation was interpreted very broadly by the courts, and federal preemption of the states was actively pursued by federal bank regulators (specifically, the OCC and OTS housed within Treasury). In 2004, the OCC asserted full preemption power over state laws (Wilmarth, 2004 
A Consumer Financial Protection Agency
Proposals for a CFPA are based on the idea that what is needed to remedy federal regulatory failures is a new agency with a single focus on consumer protection and broad authority to regulate all sellers of financial services. Such an agency would address the underlying structural issues that reduce attention to consumer protection in the current regulatory system. A CFPA would not find its consumer protection mission hindered by a competing focus on firm solvency due to institutionally based regulation, by regulatory gaps arising from dispersed authority, or by regulatory arbitrage brought on by chartering competition McCoy, 2009 ). That does not imply, however, that a CFPA is the only or the best solution. Having laid out the problems with current consumer protection regulation, we should examine the benefits and costs of a range of alternative responses in order to design a better regulatory model.
One advantage of establishing a CFPA is it creates a highly motivated regulator with a well-defined core mission. If granted sufficient authority and funding, such an agency can develop and implement a strong regulatory agenda. However, a strong highly motivated regulator may have a tendency to over-regulate, especially if given a narrowly focused mission. One argument in favor of institutionally-based regulation is that each regulator must balance the desire to protect consumers with the need for an efficient, profitable, and solvent industry; and is in a position to observe the impact of regulations on both sides of the market.
Appropriate balance is difficult to obtain and current U.S. bank regulation has placed too little emphasis on consumer protection; but an agency with the sole mission of protecting consumers may push too far in the opposite direction. This concern may be especially salient to some observers because the creation of a CFPA has been marketed as a response to the recent financial crisis. A regulatory agency created as an immediate response to a crisis may be prone to politicized responses that lead to over-regulation.
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The opposite concern also arises --that lacking in authority or starved of funding, a separate consumer protection agency will be unable to fulfill its mission. A stand-alone CFPA may be more easily deprived of adequate authority or funding by opponents of its mission. This could occur in the enabling legislation or in the budgetary process in future years. 18 Perhaps for this reason, current proposals for a CFPA include the provision that it be financed by fees from regulated firms. Based on the experience of the OTC, some observers fear that this would lead to undue industry influence over the agency and reduce its effectiveness (McCoy, 2009 ). However, as noted earlier, fee-based funding alone does not lead to regulatory capture. A CFPA's lack of chartering authority and its broad authority over providers of banking products will reduce its susceptibility to regulatory arbitrage.
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A separate concern about a CFPA is its lack of regulatory expertise. An alternative that would build on existing regulatory competencies is to provide current regulatory agencies with stronger directives. The main risk of this approach is that internal agency decisions to reduce budget, authority or staffing could undermine the consumer protection 17 Joskow (2009) provides an insightful discussion of industrial regulation and deregulation and raises concerns about the recent financial crisis being used as a rationale for re-regulating the economy. 18 Examples of narrowly focused agencies that have faced such difficulties include the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). 19 See and Bar-Gill and Warren (2008) . Other observers raise concerns that the proposed CFPA does not consolidate consumer protection regulation far enough -because it does not include institutions regulated by the SEC, CFTC or state insurance regulators (Scott, 2009; Tatom, 2009 ). This continues the threat of regulatory gaps and regulatory arbitrage.
function. For example, the Fed has strong consumer protection rule-making authority and has recently begun to exercise it by rewriting credit card disclosure rules and banning overdraft fees for ATM and debit card transactions. However, its persistent failure to do so prior to the financial crisis demonstrates the potential for ideology or rent-seeking to affect the allocation of attention.
For this reason, it is important that the consumer protection mission is provided equal authority and an independent funding stream. It would be possible to design these features into existing regulatory agencies by enhancing divisional authority and providing funding through industry fees. This would have the advantage of making use of existing organizational infrastructure. It would also preserve any synergies between market conduct and safety and soundness regulation within each agency (Schooner, 2005) . However, assuring the continuing equality and independence of consumer protection regulation would present a larger challenge under this approach.
Providing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with additional regulatory authority over financial institutions is another approach that would take advantage of existing regulatory missions and competencies (Schooner, 2005) . The FTC is an independent federal agency with a broad consumer protection mission and has experience and expertise in oversight of consumer financial products offered by non-bank institutions. Moreover, the FTC's consumer protection mission includes that of promoting competition in markets. This broadens the FTC's perspective to include the goal of market efficiency and may reduce the likelihood that it would choose overly-intrusive consumer protection regulations (Rosch, 2009 ). Another check on over-regulation by the FTC may be its responsibility for consumer protection in all economic sectors, not just financial institutions. This requires resources to be allocated to various industries and problems based on the relative need for regulatory action. Financial Services Oversight Council (membership to include all of the major bank regulators, the SEC, the CFTC and others).
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Conclusions
The current system of U.S. bank regulation is fragmented and inefficient and does not adequately fulfill its consumer protection mission. To assure consistent and continuing oversight over the long run, increased authority for consumer protection regulation should be established and this authority should be supported by a dedicated funding stream insulated from shifts in the political environment.
A new Consumer Financial Protection Agency funded by fees from industry is one way to achieve this. An important strength of the CFPA proposal is the consolidation of consumer protection regulation in a single financial regulatory agency. All banking institutions would be subject to a common set of enforcement standards and would be unable to avoid compliance by choosing a different regulator or using the threat of choice to weaken regulatory enforcement. A CFPA would also guarantee the long term independence and vitality of the consumer protection mission in the bank regulatory system. is enforced by the Fed and the bank regulators. Legislation could instead be aimed toward establishing a strong, independently-funded consumer protection agenda for these regulatory agencies, while preserving the Fed's current rule-writing authority to ensure the same regulations apply to all firms. This would move the system toward a more equal balance of consumer protection and safety and soundness regulation without the disruption and costs associated with adding a CFPA to the mix.
